What the #$%& Is Happening on Television? Indecency in Broadcasting by Chidester, Treasa
WHAT THE #$%& IS HAPPENING ON
TELEVISION? INDECENCY IN
BROADCASTING
Treasa Chidester
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine sitting down with your children to watch an awards show on
television aired live during "prime-time" hours.' While watching the show,
you are shocked when you and your family hear an award recipient use "the F-
word" in an acceptance speech.2 This is exactly what happened at the January
2003 Golden Globe Awards, when U2 singer Bono accepted an award and
exclaimed: "This is really, really, fucking brilliant."3
You brush it off as a mishap that accidentally sneaked past the censors, but a
few months later you hear it again on a different awards show.' This time the
word is uttered by one of the presenters during a monologue This is exactly
what happened at the December 2003 Billboard Music Awards when "The
i "Prime-time" hours have been described by the Federal Communications Commission
as:
[T]he period from 8 to 11:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 7 to 11:00 p.m. on
Sunday local time, except that in the central time zone the relevant period shall be be-
tween the hours of 7 and 10:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 6 and 10:00 p.m.
on Sunday, and in the mountain time zone each station shall elect whether the period
shall be 8 to 11:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 7 to 11:00 p.m. on Sunday, or 7
to 10:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday and 6 to 10:00 on Sunday.
In re Implementation of Video Description of Video Programming, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 1251, 1264 (2001).
2 Frank Ahrens, FCC Chairman Seeks Reversal on Profanity, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,
2004, at El.
3 In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globes Award" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 19859
(2003).
4 Ahrens, supra note 2.
5 Id_
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Simple Life" star Nicole Richie stated, "Have you ever tried to get cow
[expletive deleted] out of a Prada purse? It's not so [expletive deleted]
simple."6 You think that now using the word "fuck" seems more than a mere
oversight of censorship - it seems almost commonplace.
To top it off, another slip of censorship occurred during the Super Bowl; this
time a visual display of indecency.7 In January 2004, during the half-time
performance at Super Bowl XXXVIII, singer Janet Jackson's breast was
exposed when fellow performer Justin Timberlake removed a portion of
Jackson's costume at the end of a performance Whether the exposure was an
accident or a publicity stunt, the result was a two-second airing of Jackson's
breast to ninety million viewers. 9
Not only confined to awards shows and special events, the use of obscenities
and nudity on television has become increasingly popular in recent years.'
This increase has sparked concern over the way indecency on television should
be regulated." The rise in the use of profane language has been well
documented by the parental watchdog group Parents Television Council
("PTC"). 2 PTC claims that indecency has increased by as much as 94% in the
6 Frank Ahrens, Nasty Language on Live TV Renews Old Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 13,
2003, at A l. There is some debate over whether producers encouraged an "edgy" perform-
ance, expecting that the time delay would provide censors the opportunity to delete any ob-
scenities. Id.
7 See generally Joe Flint & Ann Marie Squeo, Super Bowl Halftime Stunt Angers NFL,
CBS, FCC, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2004, at B I [hereinafter Flint & Squeo].
8 Elizabeth Jensen et. al., Accusations Fly, Questions Linger After Super Bowl Peekaboo
Show; Pressure Heightens on FCC to Require Air-Delay on Live Events, Including This
Weekend's Grammy Awards, WICHITA EAGLE (Kansas), Feb. 4, 2004, at 5.
9 Id. Jackson and Timberlake originally claimed that the exposure was an accident re-
sulting from a "wardrobe malfunction" and that part of Jackson's costume was supposed to
remain in place when Timberlake pulled off an outer layer. Later Timberlake backed down
from the "wardrobe malfunction" claim, leaving critics to suggest it was a stunt done to in-
crease sales of Jackson's next album that was set for release three months after the Super
Bowl. Id.
10 Maureen Hayden, A Blue Streak As Our Use of Dirty Words Grows, Is Offensiveness
In the Ear of the Beholder?, EVANSVILLE COURIER (Indiana), Nov. 8, 2003, at B 1; see also
Larry McShane, Wrestling's Ultimate Match It 's Ted Turner 's WCW vs. Vince McMahon 's
WWF, Winner Take All, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Jun. 27, 1999, at El (documenting the
use of foul language in a 100 hour block of time and focusing on the possibility that profes-
sional wrestlers are encouraged to use indecent language on television); Blue Language Red
Hot on Movies, Television Shows, New Study Finds, MEDIA REP. TO WOMEN, Jan. 1, 2000,
at 45. (describing the incidence of profane language on network television during the 1998-
1999 season as "once every six minutes" and "every two minutes" on cable and that fact that
the incidence of profanity in the top money making films of the same year rivaled that of
television).
11 PARENT'S TELEVISION COUNCIL, DERELICTION OF DUTY: HOW THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION HAS FAILED THE PUBLIC, at http://www.parents-
tv.org/PTC/publications/reports/fccwhitepaper/main.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
12 PARENT'S TELEVISION COUNCIL, THE BLUE TUBE: FOUL LANGUAGE ON PRIME TIME
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last three years. 3 The increase in the use of profanity is particularly alarming
to the PTC, especially during the so-called "family hour," or the hours between
8 p.m. and 9 p.m. when children normally constitute a portion of the
audience. '4
The impetus behind the increase in indecency is difficult to pinpoint.
Possible factors include the increase of profanity in societal conversation, 5 a
decrease in morality, 6 and financial motivation felt by broadcast television to
"keep up" with the racy language permitted on cable television.'7 An even
bigger debate lies in the manner in which indecency should be controlled,'8 if
at all.' 9 As Justice Harlan once wrote, "one man's vulgarity is another's
lyric."2  Nevertheless, the recent uproar has called into question whether
current regulatory schemes are sufficient to curb the recent trend,2' as well as
whether any control can be achieved within the bounds of the First
Amendment.22
This comment, in Section II, explores the history and extent of First
Amendment protection; which is essential in determining which types of
speech receive constitutional protection and which do not. Section III explains
why television is regulated and explores the differences between indecency
and obscenity on television. This Comment addresses the prominent role of
television in the lives of American children and why the state is permitted to
regulate television content to protect children. Section IV addresses how the
NETWORK TV; A PTC STATE OF THE TELEVISION INDUSTRY REPORT, at
http://www.parentstv.org[PTC/pubications/reports/stateindustrylanguage/main.asp (Sept.
19, 2003).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Pat Shellenbarger, *#&!!@%*$#! Mania ... Swearing Has Become So (Bleeping)
Common, Some People Hardly Even Notice Anymore, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 28, 1998,
at C1.
16 But cf Study on Foul Language on Television Raises False Alarm, Says Swarthmore
College Language Expert, ASCRIBE NEWS, Sept. 24, 2003 (stating that the increase in the
use of profanity does not indicate a degeneration in morality, but rather it is a result of
changing standards of societal acceptability).
17 Ann Oldenburg, Raunchy Behavior Bursts Out All Over; Bono and the F-Word
Started FCC Scrutiny, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 2004, at D 1.
18 PARENT'S TELEVISION COUNCIL, POWELL DECISION ON F-WORD NOT ENOUGH, at
http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/publications/release/2004/0114.asp (Jun. 28, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter POWELL DECISION].
'9 See generally Edward Epstein, GOP Representative Would Ban Dirty Words From
TV / Ose Angry that FCC Failed to Act When Bono, Richie Used F Word, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Jan. 9, 2004, at A4.
20 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
21 POWELL DECISION, supra note 18.
22 Frank Ahrens, Nasty Language on Live TV Renews Old Debate, WASH. POST, Dec.
13, 2003, at Al.
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regulation process occurs, in order to understand the extent of the FCC's power
and the manner in which grievances are settled. Section V investigates current
non-regulatory measures available to lessen indecency on television. Section
VI introduces new legislation aimed at combating indecency. Section VII
addresses the opposition to the new legislation by presenting the views of First
Amendment advocates, which is pivotal in order to anticipate constitutional
challenges the new legislation may instigate. Section VIII evaluates the
effectiveness and constitutionality of the proposed legislation. This Comment
asserts that the proposed changes in legislation to combat indecency on
television are not sufficient to curb indecency, either because they will not
stand up to constitutional challenges, or because they do not address the flawed
penalty system currently in place.
11. ISN'T ALL SPEECH FREE?
The regulation of indecency and obscenity came to the forefront of recent
societal debate when the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") ruled
that the use of the word "fuck" used as an adjective by Bono did not constitute
indecent language.23 The "Bono decision," " combined with the controversial
display of nudity at the Super Bowl,25 has elevated indecency on television to a
hot political issue.26 In order to evaluate whether the initial "Bono decision"27
was correct or whether Janet Jackson's fleeting moment of nudity at the Super
Bowl 28 will qualify as indecent, it is necessary to first define indecency and
properly place it in its First Amendment context.
A. First Amendment Protection of Speech
Freedom of speech has been regarded as a priority in the United States since
the beginning of the country.29 After years of tyrannical restraint of speech
under English rule, Colonial activists were leery that the new government of
23 In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globes Award" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 19859
(2003) [hereinafter Complaints].
24 Id.
25 Glenn Garvin, Fallout; After Janet Jackson's Exposure, Networks Cover Their Bases
and Brace for Tough New Decency Rules; Television, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2004, at A 1.
26 The increase of indecent acts on television has angered the current administration and
spawned bipartisan legislation in both houses of Congress. Flint & Squeo, supra note 7; see
also S. Res. 283, 108t Cong. (2003).
27 Complaints, supra note 23.
28 David Bauder, After Halftime, Freefall of Standards Likely to Stop, SUN HERALD
(Miss.), Feb. 6, 2004, at B2.
29 MARY HULL, CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA 2-5 (1999).
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the United States would, like its English antecedents, assert its influence over
speech.3" The Colonists particularly feared a reprisal of English law, which
forbid any criticism of the government, a crime called "seditious libel".'
Because of the colonists' earlier experience with Government clampdowns
on speech, freedom of speech was codified in American law with the
ratification of the First Amendment in 1791." The First Amendment is
grounded in the notion that candid expression of ideas improves society as a
whole.33 The idea that free speech makes for a better society is embedded in
three concepts deeply rooted in American case-law. First, the belief that
freedom of speech leads to better informed citizens who are more capable of
performing an active role in the political process.34 Justice Harlan's opinion in
Cohen v. California35 illustrates this concept:
[The First Amendment] is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from
the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely
into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a
more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.
36
The second premise animating the First Amendment is that free exchange of
ideas allows the truth or falsehood of an idea to be proven.37 This theory is
based on the rationale that the best way to test the validity of a claim is to
subject it to public scrutiny. 3 This is a theory commonly called the "discovery
of truth."39 The "discovery of truth" model of free speech is best summarized
by Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States," where he
stated, "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
30 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 748-50 (1997).
31 Id. at 749.
32 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.").
33 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 752; see also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964) (stating that the First Amendment is based on "a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials").
34 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 752 (calling this aspect of free speech "self govern-
ance").
35 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
36 Id. at 24.
37 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 753.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 250 U.S. 616(1919).
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their wishes safely can be carried out."'"
Lastly, freedom of speech is grounded in the theory that, as a basic condition
of liberty, Americans should choose what speech is acceptable.42 This theory
has been referred to as "advancing autonomy."43 The autonomy model of free
speech is also evident in Cohen," where the Court stated, "it is nevertheless
often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is
largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in
this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the
individual."45
Despite the inclusion of freedom of speech in the First Amendment
however, there has never been a time in America when speech was completely
uninhibited.46 Certain types of speech do not receive First Amendment
protection at all.47 The following are examples of speech types traditionally
held to be restrained.
1. Speech that is Not Protected By the First Amendment
The First Amendment's freedom of speech is not an "absolute" freedom.48
There are narrow exceptions for speech that does not effectuate a more
informed politic, nor aid in the discovery of truth, nor advance autonomy.49
These exceptions are for speech that has little social value and as a result is
able to be regulated without violating the First Amendment." In Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire,5 the Supreme Court listed some of these categories of speech
as "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words." 2 In addition to the Chaplinsky list, speech encouraging
illegal conduct is also a category of speech not protected by the First
Amendment.53
41 Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
42 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 754.
43 Id.
- 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (addressing whether a t-shirt bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"
deserved First Amendment protection).
45 Id. at 25.
46 HULL, supra note 29, at 2-5.
47 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 571-572.
50 Id. In Chaplinsky, the Court described these words as "[w]ell-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem." Id. at 571-72.
51 Id. at 571.
52 Id. at 572.
53 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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a. Defamation
Defamation is traditionally not protected by the First Amendment, 4 but
because of the importance of the "marketplace of ideas" and the concept of an
informed public, there are limits to the definition of defamation.5 Achieving
the aims of the First Amendment may at times require protecting speech that
"includes[s] vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks."56
Based on this foundation, in N.Y Times v. Sullivan,57 the Supreme Court held
that in order to successfully recover for defamation or libel there must be more
than a mere attack on a person's character. 8 The Supreme Court held that
there must be evidence that the person launching the attack did so "with
knowledge that [the accusations were] false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."59
b. Fighting Words
In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court defined fighting words as those that "by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breech of the
peace."60 Chaplinsky involved a man who was distributing literature on a street
comer and "denouncing all religion as a 'racket."' 6  Mr. Chaplinsky's
language was upsetting to enough people that the police were called for an
ensuing riot.62 The Court announced that the test for fighting words was "what
men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause
54 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
55 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
56 Id. at 271.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 279-80.
59 Id. at 280. N.Y Times involved a 1960 advertisement placed in the N.Y. Times solic-
iting support for the desegregation movement. Id. at 256-58. In the ad, the police depart-
ment of Montgomery, Alabama was criticized for its handling of recent desegregation dem-
onstrations. Id. at 257-58. The Commissioner from Alabama in charge of the Montgomery
police sued for defamation, alleging that any disparaging remarks against the police were
concerning him personally, since his job was one of supervision. Id. at 258. The Court held
that the speech was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 296-97. The ad did not rise to
the level of defamation because there was no evidence to suggest that neither the party that
placed the ad, nor the newspaper itself, did so recklessly or with knowledge that ad con-
tained errors. Id. at 286. In fact there were small errors contained in the ad pertaining to
some of the factual details of particular protests, for example which particular song was
sung by protestors. The Court did not place much weight on these inconsequential errors.
Id. at 258-259.
60 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
61 Id at 570.
62 Id.
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an average addressee to fight."63 The Court held that the words spoken by Mr.
Chaplinsky met this test.64
The Court, however, reduced the scope of the "fighting words" doctrine in
Cohen v. California65 by stating that the words must be directed at an
individual in order to rise to the level of fighting words. 6 6 Cohen involved a
man who walked into the city courthouse wearing a jacket with the words
"Fuck the Draft" on the back.67 The Court found that this language did not
qualify as fighting words because it was neither directed at an individual nor
meant to "provoke[e] a given group to hostile reaction."68
"Hostile audience" cases are a subset of "fighting words."69 These cases
involve the application of the "clear and present danger test" to factual
scenarios where a speaker has incited a violent reaction in an audience." The
Court has approached these cases with mixed treatment. In Terminiello v.
Chicago,7 a case involving a politician who called his rivals names resulting in
an uprising, the Court held that the insults were protected speech. The
Supreme Court said speech that evokes hostility in an audience should still be
protected "unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest."73 The Court felt that because the purpose of freedom of speech is to
"invite dispute," the breach of the peace under these circumstances did not rise
to the level of a "clear and present danger."74
An additional concem in hostile audience cases is the potential for
unfairness in the respect that it is the audience, and not the speaker, that would
have control over whether the speech would be protected.75 This is because a
speaker may be convicted on these grounds when the crowd is out of control as
a result of his speech. 6 The Supreme Court has noted this flaw77 and is
63 Id. at 573.
64 Id. at 574.
65 403 U.S. 15 (1973).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 16.
68 Id. at 20. The Court has construed the definition of fighting words rather narrowly. Id.
After Chaplinsky, the Court has never found a conviction on a "fighting words" statute con-
stitutional. Id.
69 See id at 821.
70 Id.
71 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
72 Id.
73 See id at 4.
74 Id
75 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 822.
76 Id.
77 See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 325-326 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
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reluctant to uphold convictions as a result of hostile audiences."8
c. Advocacy of Illegal Conduct
"Advocacy of illegal conduct" is when a speaker intends to cause the
audience hearing the speech to commit an illegal act.79 Like "hostile audience"
cases, advocacy of illegal conduct involves the effect of a speaker on the
listener.8" It is not protected by the First Amendment precisely because of this
effect." In Schenck v. United States,8 2 the Supreme Court held that speech can
be regulated when the intent of the speaker is to evoke illegal action. 3 Decided
during World War I, Schenck involved speech printed on a leaflet encouraging
men to resist participation in the draft. 4 Draft participation was mandatory and
"obstruct[ing] the recruiting or enlistment service" was illegal by statute. 5 The
Court noted, "[t]he question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent."86 The Court held that the words printed were intended to "obstruct
the carrying ... out" of the draft law.87
78 See e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1963) (holding that a civil
rights protest held by African American protestors at the South Carolina capitol did not meet
the "clear and present danger test" because there was sufficient police presence at the dem-
onstration to quell any upraising that may have occurred); Cox v. Louisiana., 379 U.S. 536,
550 (1965) (holding that a speaker protesting racial segregation could not be convicted un-
der hostile audience rationale when no on-lookers threatened violence and even if violence
would have been threatened police were present to assert control).
79 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 814.
80 See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (involving a "circular"
encouraging illegal conduct from the people who read the material); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315, 317 (1951) (involving a situation where an African American male during a
civil rights gathering was "endeavoring to arouse the [African American] people against the
whites.")
8' CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 814.
82 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
83 See id. at 52.
84 Id. at 51.
85 Id. at 53.
86 Id. at 52.
87 Id. at 51. When looking at the facts, the holding in Schenck may seem extreme by
today's standards, but it must be viewed in light of the political climate of the time to be
fully understood. Schenck took place when the United States was involved in a war that
was unpopular by a sizeable segment of the population. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30 at
803. As a result, the Espionage Act of 1917, which was the statute at issue in Schenck, was
enacted to prevent anti-government uprisings in the United States like had happened in other
parts of the world. Id. Therefore, the "wartime circumstances" found in Schenck were
unique and speech that otherwise might have fell under the First Amendment was barred.
See id. For other war-time decisions involving advocacy of illegal conduct, see also
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The Schenck holding has been called the "clear and present danger test.""
The classic example of speech that meets the "clear and present danger test" is
yelling "fire" in a crowded theater. 9 Brandenberg v. Ohio9" further defined the
clear and present danger test, where the Court held that speech "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action" would only be unconstitutional
if it was actually "likely to produce such action."'" This prong further
expanded speech protection.92 Schenck and Brandenberg read together create a
three-part test for courts to apply when determining advocacy of illegal
conduct. The advocacy must have the: 1) likelihood to produce, 2) imminent,
3) lawless action.93
d Lewd and Obscene
Lewd and obscene speech was defined by the Court in Roth v. United
States94 as speech "which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest."95 Roth, decided in 1957, was the first time that the Supreme Court
addressed obscenity directly.96 Supreme Court opinions dating as far back as
187797 however, implied obscenity was not protected by the First
Amendment.9" This is particularly true because of the threat of exposure to
children.99
Roth involved challenges to two obscenity statutes banning the mailing of
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)
and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
88 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 803.
89 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
90 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
91 Id. at 447 (1969). Brandenberg involved a film made during a Ku Klux Klan meeting
in which there were racial slurs used. Id. at 446. The film was made by a member of the
media invited to the meeting and aired on television after the fact. Id. at 445. The Court in
Brandenberg did not define "imminent" or "likely to produce," but conceded that they were
not met under these facts. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 813.
92 CHEMERINSKY, SUpra note 30, at 813.
93 Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919). See Hess v. Indiana (holding that the threat, "[w]e'll take the fucking streets later,"
made to a police officer made during an antiwar demonstration did not qualify as advocacy
of illegal conduct because the statement "amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal
action at some indefinite future time;" it failed the "likely to produce" and the "imminent"
requirements of the three part test).
94 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
95 Id. at 487.
96 Id. at 481.
97 See generally Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
98 Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.
99 Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-59 (1973).
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obscene materials and confirmed this implication.' °° The Roth Court made
clear that obscenity is not the same as sex.0 ' Roth explained the difference on
two levels. First, the Court viewed sex as a topic of great public interest and
debate.0 2 Therefore, barring or placing prior restraints 3 on the discussion of
sex would violate the liberty foundation of the First Amendment.' 4  When
Roth defined obscenity, the Court set out that there must be more than a
"portrayal of sex."'0 5 The Court decided on the "prurient interest test," stating
that material would only be obscene if it contained "material having a tendency
to excite lustful thoughts."'0 6 This sex/obscenity distinction is necessary to
prevent the banning of educational and literary materials that approach sex in a
refined manner.' 7
The Roth court's vague "prurient interest" standard was expanded in Miller
v. California,' where the Court established a three part test to determine if
material was obscene. Miller concerned facts similar to those of Roth. In
Miller, a man had mailed unsolicited advertisements for books and a video
dealing with sex. 9  The advertisement included pictures of individuals
"engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently
displayed.""'  The sender of the material had been prosecuted under a
California statute banning the distribution of obscene material."'
Miller adopted a standard for courts to apply that echoed the California
statute,' 2 consisting of:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest (b) whether the work de-
picts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
1oo Roth, 354 U.S. at 480-81.
'o' Id. at 487.
102 Id. at 487-88.
103 Prior restraint means a mechanism instituted to prevent speech from happening be-
fore it occurs. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 770. There are several forms that prior re-
straints can take, including court orders and license requirements. Id. 776-86.
104 Roth, 354 U.S. at 488.
105 Id. at 487.
106 Id. at 487-88.
107 Id.
108 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
109 Id. at 18. The materials advertised included four books named "Intercourse", "Man-
Woman", "Sex Orgies Illustrated", "Illustrated History of Pornography" and a video titled
"Marital Intercourse". Id.
11o Id.
II ld. at 16. Obscene was defined by the statute as material that: to the average person,
applying contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is
to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which
goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of
such matters and is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance. Id.
112 Id. at 24.
20041
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value."
3
The Court in Miller gave a few examples of material that would be patently
offensive and thereby obscene." 4  These included "ultimate sex acts,"
"masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of genitals."'' 5 The
examples in Miller are not intended to be an exclusive list, but are intended to
set the "substantive constitutional" scope of the law."6 The Court was clear to
establish, however, that the states were responsible for detailing their particular
statutory definition of obscenity." 7
Beyond Miller, subsequent cases have given meaning to all three prongs of
the Miller test. In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 8 concerning the first
prong of the Miller test, the Court narrowed the definition of "prurient" by
holding that a statute outlawing material that does not clearly differentiate
between a normal interest in sex"' and a "shameful or morbid interest,"'2
would be unconstitutional on the grounds that it was overly broad.'2 ' The
"contemporary community standard" of the first prong was defined in Miller as
the local community, not a national community.' 22 The Court later held, in
Hamling v. United States, 23 that the local community standard is the standard
of the community in which the jury is selected.'24 This standard applies even
when the statute is a national one that would span several local communities. 25
When explaining the second prong of the Miller test in Ward v. Illinois,'26
the Supreme Court held that a statute does not have to include an "exhaustive
list" of material that is deemed to be patently offensive under the state
statute.' 27 The fact that a statute incorporates examples and adequately reflects
the language in Miller will be enough for a statute to pass constitutional
muster. 28 However, the term "patently offensive" does have boundaries. In
113 Miller, 413 U.S. at 39.
114 Id. at 25.
115 Id.
116 Jenkins v. Georgia., 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974).
117 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
118 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
119 Here the word "lust" was held to mean a normal interest in sex. Id. at 504-05.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 505. Overly broad means "a statue is so broadly written that it deters free ex-
pression." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1129 (7 th ed.1999)[hereinafter BLACK'S]. If a statute
is overbroad it will be found unconstitutional "because of its chilling effect" on speech. Id.
122 Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
123 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
124 Id. at 106.
125 Id.
126 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
127 See id. at 776.
128 Id.
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Jenkins v. Georgia,29 the film Carnal Knowledge was challenged as being
"patently offensive" on the grounds that it showed nudity and sexual acts. 3 'The Court held that the film was not patently offensive because, even though itimplied ultimate sex acts, "the camera does not focus on the bodies of theactors at such times."'' The scenes in question did not show the actors genitals
and despite some shots of nudity, the Court held that "nudity alone is not
enough" to qualify as "patently offensive." '
Finally, contrary to the first prong of Miller, the Supreme Court has heldthat the third prong of the Miller test must be determined on a standard broaderthan the local community.'33 In Pope v. Illinois,3 ' the Court stated that whether
material lacks artistic, literary, political or social value does not "vary fromcommunity to community."'35 The Court held, therefore, that the proper test iswhether a reasonable person in any community would find the material lacked
such value when taken as a whole.'36
Because obscene speech receives no First Amendment protection, combinedwith the danger that it poses to children, obscenity may be regulated to anextent greater than sex alone. 3' In Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton,'38 theSupreme Court held that to meet these goals, the state may prevent theshowing of obscene materials.'39 The Court qualified this harsh rule ofregulation in Paris by noting that materials were not "restrained" until therehad been a "full adversary proceeding and a final judicial determination...
that the materials were constitutionally unprotected."'40
2. Restrictions on the Content of Speech-Content Based Law v. Content
Neutral Laws
Regulation of the content of speech is "presumptively invalid," outside ofthe narrow exceptions where First Amendment protection does not reach,because restrictions on the content of speech directly contradict the premise ofthe First Amendment.' Outside of these narrow exceptions, any content-
129 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
130 id. at 158-59.
131 Id. at 161.
132 Id.
133 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
134 Id.
135 Id
136 Id.
'37 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-59 (1973).
138 See generally id.
139 ld. at 57.
140 Id.
141 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
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based regulation on speech will be subject to strict scrutiny.42 Strict scrutiny is
a level of judicial examination whereby a regulation will be upheld only if
there is a "compelling state interest"'43 for the regulation and the regulation is
"narrowly tailored"'" to meet that interest.'45
When there is a regulation that does not regulate the content of speech, yet
still impacts speech, the regulation is subjected to a lower form of judicial
examination called intermediate scrutiny.'46 These types of regulations are
called content-neutral regulations.'47 Therefore, when evaluating a statute for
constitutionality it is critical for the Court to determine whether the statute is
one that regulates content or one that is content neutral.
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C.,'48 the Court acknowledged
that determining whether a statute was content-neutral or content-based was
not always clear cut.'49 The Court stated, "laws that by their terms distinguish
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views
expressed are content-based."' 50 Alternatively, statutes that place "benefits or
impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed
are in most instances content-neutral."' 5  Therefore, regulations based on the
"viewpoint" or "message" of the speaker are content-based and consequently
not permissible, while regulations that do not target particular views and are
broadly applied are content-neutral and thus permissible.'52
3. Permissible Content-Neutral Restrictions
Content-neutral regulations may place "reasonable" standards on the time
that the speech may occur, the place where the speech may occur, and the
142 Hamilton v. San Bernardino, 107 F Supp. 2d 1239, 1242 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
143 The compelling state interest test is defined as "a method for determining the consti-
tutional validity of a law, whereby the government's interest in the law is balanced against
the individual's constitutional right to be free of the law, and only if the government's inter-
est is strong enough will the law be upheld." BLACK'S, supra note 121, at 277.
144 Narrowly tailored is defined as "being only as broad as is reasonably necessary to
promote a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively without
the restriction; no broader than necessary." BLACK'S, supra note 121, at 1045.
145 Hamilton, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1247. Strict scrutiny analysis is the most rigorous form
of judicial examination, and is applied to laws that restrict the content of speech so as not to
allow the government to "target" regulations towards topics of speech of which it does not
approve.
146 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
147 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 758.
148 Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 643.
'' Id.
152 See id at 641-43.
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manner in which the speech may occur."' These restrictions are called "time,
place, and manner" restrictions or regulations. 5 4  In Ward v. Rock Against
Racism,'55 the Supreme Court made clear that in order to pass the intermediate
level of judicial scrutiny, content-neutral restrictions must be made "without
reference to the content of the regulated speech."'56
Ward illustrates the "three part test" needed to satisfy the constitutionality of
content-neutral, "time place, and manner restrictions.""' In order for the
regulation to be constitutional it must be content-neutral,' 58 narrowly tailored to
meet the specific interest on which the government bases the restriction,'59 and
there must be ample alternative means for the speaker to reach the target
audience.'6 °
Time, place, and manner regulations typically involve speech that occurs in
the "public forum."'' Public forum has a rather constricted definition within
the judiciary.'62 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,'63 the
Court held that places "held in trust" for citizens would be deemed to be the
public forum." Examples of these places include public streets and parks.'65
Citizens are generally allowed to use the public forum to express ideas and
debate 66 in conformity with the underpinnings of the First Amendment. The
privilege of using the public forum, however, may be regulated with proper
time, place, and manner controls in order to maintain peace and good order.'67
153 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789-91 (1989).
154 Richard A. Seid, A Requiem for O'Brien: On the Nature of Symbolic Speech, 23
CUMB. L. REV. 563, 580 (1993).
155 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
156 Id. at 790.
157 Id.
158 Meaning that a regulation cannot be selective in the groups or type of speech that it
prohibits. See Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (stating that a pick-
eting ordinance was unconstitutional because it "describes impermissible picketing not in
terms of time, place, and manner, but in terms of subject matter."). Here, the ordinance al-
lowed picketing about labor issues, but forbid picketing about any other issue. Id.
159 See supra note 155 for a discussion of narrowly tailored.
160 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
161 See CHEMERINSKY,SUpra note 30, at 924.
162 See generally Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (discussing the
use of public spaces for speech).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 515.
165 Id.
166 Id. at515-16.
167 Id.; see also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941) (upholding con-
victions of sixty-eight religious demonstrators who walked along the sidewalk carrying
signs, etc. The Court stated that the licensing statute under which they were convicted was
constitutional because requiring a license for parades and processions was part of the gov-
ernment's way to provide "proper policing" and "prevent confusion by overlapping pa-
rades").
20041
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Thus, so long as they meet the Ward test, states have a right to create time,
place, and manner statutes under their general police power. 68
Although television is accessed by a large portion of the population, and
arguably has characteristics of a "public forum," it is not treated as public
forum for purposes of freedom of speech. 69 Where content of speech cannot
be regulated in the traditional public forum, it can be regulated on television. 7
Speech content can be regulated on television when the material approaches,
but does not quite meet, the level of obscenity. 7 ' Indecent speech that is
constitutionally protected in the traditional "public forum" may be regulated on
television.'72
III. YOU CAN'T SAY THAT ON TELEVISION?! WHERE WE CAME
FROM.
A. Why Television Can be Regulated
Television is held to a standard different than free speech in the regular
"public forum" because it confronts citizens in their own homes and is readily
accessible to children.'73 Approximately 98% of American homes have a
minimum of one television.'74 According to one study, children between the
ages of two and seventeen watch almost twenty hours of television per week.'75
Over half of American children ages eight to sixteen have a television set in
their bedroom.'76 Thus, many children watch television when there is no
supervising adult present to monitor the content.'77 Therefore, speech that
would otherwise be protected in the traditional "public forum" may be
168 Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 150 (1939).
169 See generally James E. Fleming, et al, Panel IV: Censorship of Cable Television's
Leased and Public Access Channels, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 801
(1994) (discussing some of the attributes of public access television channels such as avail-
ability to a wide portion of the population).
170 See, e.g.. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Although Pacifica itself
does not specifically speak of radio, the decision in Pacifica has been extended to cover
television as well. See In re Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law Interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement,
16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8000 (2001).
171 See id.
172 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 750 (1996).
'73 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726.
174 Catherine Edman, Television is a Bona Fide American Tradition. But Not Everyone
is OK With That Fact, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Apr. 22, 2002.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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regulated when it is on television.' When speech is regulated on television,
there are limitations in place to make certain that the First Amendment is given
the utmost deference. 79
B. Obscene Television
Obscenity, because it is not afforded First Amendment protection, is strictly
prohibited on television by statute.' 47 U.S.C. §559 allows for a fine and a
prison sentence to any person who "transmits" obscene material over "any
cable system."'' The obscenity test as defined by the Miller Court is also
applied to television.'82 However, the Miller obscenity test does not supply a
definition for indecency.'83 This is where the FCC takes over.
C. Indecency Defined
The FCC designates broadcast indecency as "language or material that, in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community broadcast standards for the broadcast medium,
sexual or excretory organs or activities."'84 Since indecent material does not
quite amount to obscenity, the content is still afforded some protection under
the First Amendment. 5 As a result of the protections provided by the First
Amendment, any regulation must meet the "compelling interest" and
"narrowly tailored" prongs of the strict scrutiny test. 8 6
The FCC's compelling reason for indecency regulations is to support
"parental supervision of children and more generally its concern for children's
well being."'87 The FCC's "compelling interest" and indecency standard has
been upheld by the Supreme Court and codified by statute. 88
178 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 846.
179 FCC, THE FCC AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumer-
facts/freespeech.html (last modified April 01, 2004).
180 47 U.S.C. §559 (2000).
181 Id.
182 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also FCC, OBSCENE AND
INDECENT BROADCASTS, at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.html (last modi-
fied April 12, 2004).
183 FCC, OBSCENE AND INDECENT BROADCASTS, at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumer-
facts/obscene.htmI (last modified April 12, 2004).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 In re Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 FCC
Rcd. 7999, 8000 (2001).
187 Id. at 8001.
188 FCC, OBSCENE AND INDECENT BROADCASTS, at
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In 1978, the FCC's indecency standard was challenged in F.C.C. v. Pacifica
Foundation.'89 Pacifica involved the radio broadcast of comedian George
Carlin's monologue entitled "Filthy Words."'9 ° The monologue was aired at 2
p.m. during a radio program that was evaluating the effect and impact of
language on society. 9 ' As part of the monologue, Carlin described "words you
couldn't say on the public ... airwaves. "192
The Carlin monologue stated that there were seven "original" words that
you could not say on the airwaves, and he listed them as "shit, piss, fuck, cunt,
cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits."' 9' Carlin listed three "more words" that
are not allowed as "fart, turd and twat."'94 The gist of Carlin's monologue was
to demonstrate the many ways that these words are used in modem
conversation and to point out irony in the fact that most of the words can be
used in some context that does not make them "dirty," but when used in a
certain manner they become taboo.' 95 Carlin explained, for example, that it
would be permissible to say the word "ass" in the context of a donkey, but
saying "up your ass" would not be allowed.' 96
The complaint filed regarding the Carlin monologue came from a man who
was listening to the broadcast in his car with his young son.' 97 Upon initial
review, the FCC did not impose any penalty on the station responsible for the
broadcast, but did state that they could have been penalized.' 98 The FCC went
a step further and sought to clarify their definition of indecency because they
had been receiving a "growing number of complaints about indecent speech on
the airwaves."'9'
The statute impacting indecency at the time of Pacifica outlawed "any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication. 2 °
The FCC found that the Carlin material did not rise to the level of obscenity,
but was "patently offensive" and met their indecency standard in light of the
Commission's goal to prevent indecency "when there is a reasonable risk that
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.html (last modified April 12, 2004).
189 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
190 Id. at 729, 751 (appearing as an appendix to the Court decision in Pacifica is the en-
tire Carlin monologue); see also George Carlin's website, at http://www.georgecar-
lin.com/georgecarlin/home/home.html.) (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
191 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30.
192 Id. at 751.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 755.
195 Id. at 751-55.
196 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 755 (emphasis in original).
197 Id. at 730.
198 Id. at 730.
199 Id. at 73 1.200 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
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children may be in the audience."2 ' The FCC conceded that their ruling was
not meant to be a complete bar on indecent language, but only meant to restrict
it or "channel it" to the times of day when children would not be likely to be in
the audience and inadvertently hear indecent material." 2
The FCC's holding was overruled in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit on the grounds that it constituted impermissible
censorship.0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the
ruling was an abusive use of censorship and whether the Carlin monologue
was in fact indecent."4 On the issue of censorship, the Supreme Court held
that censorship was only abusive if the FCC proposed edits or barred material
before it was aired.00 Here, the Commission's decision had clearly been a
"subsequent review" of broadcasting and was therefore permissible.0 6
The Court evaluated the indecency of the broadcast in light of two separate
claims made by the Pacifica Foundation, the corporation that aired the Carlin
monologue. 7 First, Pacifica asserted that the FCC's definition was overbroad
because it would ban "so much constitutionally protected speech.""2 8 The
Court held that the FCC's ruling was not overbroad because it was limited to a
"specific factual context;" therefore, it was narrow enough in scope to be
constitutional .209
Second, the Pacifica Foundation argued that if the monologue did not rise to
the level of obscenity, then any ban on content should be forbidden under the
First Amendment. 20" This argument, if successful, would mean that indecency
could not be restricted at all.21' The Court acknowledged that indecent material
"offends" under the same rationale as obscenity in that it normally lack,
"literary, political or scientific value." 2 2 However, the Court acknowledged
that different levels of protection would be afforded for different "medium[s]
of expression"2 '3 and making a determination as to whether material was
indecent would require that the entire context of the situation be evaluated.
2
'
The Court recognized that broadcast speech had been assigned the least
201 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32.
202 Id. at 733.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 735, 742, 744.
205 Id. at 735.
206 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 737.
207 Id. at 742.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744.
212 Id. at 746.
213 Id. at 748.
214 Id. at 747-48.
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protection under the First Amendment.2 5 The reasoning for this is twofold.
First, broadcast speech intrudes into people's homes, where the public has a
right "to be left alone," so the privacy rights of the listening public "outweighs
the First Amendment rights of an intruder."2 6  Second, the "unique"
availability of television to children makes this medium different from other
forms of media. 17 When evaluating the Carlin monologue in light of its
particular arena and in its entire context, the Court held that the government's
interest in protecting children would allow indecency to be regulated in these
"narrow" circumstances." '
After Pacifica, issues arose as to when indecency could be regulated on
television. Congress instructed the FCC to enforce the ruling on a "24 hour per
day basis," but the Court found this unconstitutional.2 9 The Court found that
the least restrictive way to meet the goal of protecting children from unwanted
indecency was to limit potentially indecent programming to those times when
children would least likely be viewers.2 ' The FCC changed their regulatory
scheme to reflect this recommendation. 2' In 1995, the FCC put into effect 47
C.F.R. §73.3999,222 which states that no "indecent material" can be broadcast
"between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. ' 223 The statute has created a "safe harbor" from
indecency in the hours where children should be watching, but leaves the
availability open for broadcasters to air indecent material at other hours.224
IV. REGULATION IN ACTION.
When discussing the regulation of indecent speech on television, one is
confined to regulation of broadcast on so-called "public access channels,"
because cable is held to a different standard.225 Public access or broadcast
channels are free broadcast and are accessible by anyone who owns a
television and can receive a signal.226 Cable, on the other hand, must be paid
215 Id.
216 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747-48
217 Id. at 749.
218 Id. at 749-50.
219 In re Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 FCC
Rcd. 7999, 8001 (2001).
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 47 C.F.R. §73.3999 (2000).
223 Id.
224 Industry Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. at 8001.
225 Lynn Smith, FCC Examining Indecency Laws, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at 3E.
226 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 744-45
(1996).
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for and therefore does not pose the same dangers to children.2 7 At one point,
the FCC had a single standard for both cable and broadcast channels. This
changed in the 1980's when cable operators successfully challenged this
statutory scheme. -28 Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §532 however, it is constitutional
for a cable operator229 to regulate indecency if they so choose.230
A. Role of the FCC In Television Regulation
The responsibility of regulating television falls upon the FCC.2 1' The FCC
was established by the Communications Act of 1934 as the government agency
responsible for oversight of all areas of communication. The FCC is an
independent agency, meaning that it is responsible to Congress, but not the
President.233 The FCC has the power to create rules and regulations concerning
television under the power granted to them by Congress in the
Communications Act of 1934.234 The rules established by the FCC are the
main way that rules regulating speech on television are promulgated. 235
B. How the Regulation Process Occurs
While the FCC promulgates rules, it does not have an omnipotent "Oz"
227 Oldenburg, supra note 17.
228 James E. Fleming et al., Panel IV: Censorship of Cable Television's Leased and
Public Access Channels, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 801, 810 (1994). It
has been argued that indecency has risen in broadcast channels because they have to com-
pete with cable channels for viewers since so many households have cable access. Smith,
supra note 236. Therefore, they also have to compete for advertising dollars to get to those
viewers. Talk of the Nation: Analysis: Obscenity over the airways and whether Congress or
the FCC should tighten restrictions and regulations (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 28, 2004).
Arguably, this jockeying for viewers and money has caused "HBO envy" on the part of pub-
lic broadcasters forcing them to "push the envelope." Smith, supra note 225.
229 A cable operator is "any person who provides any wire or communications service."
47 U.S.C. §551(a)(2)(C) (2000).
230 47 U.S.C. §532 (2000). See Denver Area Education Telecommunications Consor-
tium Inc. v. F.C.C. (holding that a cable operator could prohibit patently offensive material
on a cable or leased channel, even though it was unconstitutional to do the same on a public
access channel).
23 1 47 U.S.C. §303(r) (2000).
232 FCC, ABOUT THE FCC, at http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last modified Sept. 14,
2004).
233 Id.
234 Id
235 State laws that have a cursory effect on speech are another way that speech on televi-
sion can be regulated. Some are unconstitutional, such as rate regulations and program ac-
cess exclusivity. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214
(1989). Others may allow a provider to choose which cable channels to include on their
service. See Cmty. Television v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D.C. Utah 1985).
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figure to monitor all T.V. all the time. A public complaint process notifies the
FCC about disputes over rules and regulations.236 Complaints about indecency
may be filed by mail or over the Intemet. 37 In response to an increase in
publicity over broadcast indecency, the FCC has created an Internet link for the
public to file complaints regarding indecency directly from their "Obscenity,
Indecency & Profanity" page on the Interet. 3 In a dramatic example of the
ease of the complaint system, the FCC received 200,000 complaints "in just
four days" after the airing of Janet Jackson's breast. 39
When a complaint is filed, it must provide the FCC with precise information
about the alleged indecent event, including the time and date of the event, the
broadcast station involved, and a description of the event 4.2 " A recording or
tape of the event may also be sent to the FCC.2 11 If this material is not properly
included, or if the broadcast occurred during the "safe harbor" hours of 10 p.m.
to 6 a.m., the complaint will be dismissed.242
The FCC applies a two-part test when evaluating complaints for
indecency.243 The FCC first looks at the "subject matter" of the material and
decides whether it is sexual or excretory in nature.4 It then decides whether
the material is "patently offensive." '245 "Patently offensive" is determined on a
case-by-case basis by looking at the entire context of the broadcast.24 6 Context
is a very important factor in the determination of indecency,247 perhaps even the
most important factor. 48
The FCC has determined that three contextual elements will influence
indecency decisions: (1) "graphic description versus indirectness/implication,"
236 See James E. Fleming et al., Panel IV: Censorship of Cable Television's Leased and
Public Access Channels, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 801 (1994).
237 FCC, FIRST AMENDMENT VS. OBSCENITY / INDECENCY, at http://www.fcc.gov/par-
ents/content.html (last modified Mar. 31, 2004).
238 See id.
239 Glenn Garvin, Fallout; After Janet Jackson 's Exposure, Networks Cover Their Bases
and Brace for Tough New Decency Rules, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2004, at Al. This num-
ber of complaints nearly matched the 240,000 number of total complaints received in 2003.
Id.
240 FCC, FIRST AMENDMENT VS. OBSCENITY / INDECENCY, at http://www.fcc.gov/par-
ents/content.html (last modified Mar. 31, 2004).
241 Id.
242 In re Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 FCC
Rcd. 7999, 8015 (2001).
243 Id. at 8002.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Industry Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. at 8002.
248 FCC, FIRST AMENDMENT VS. OBSCENITY / INDECENCY, at http://www.fcc.gov/par-
ents/content.html (last modified Mar. 31, 2004).
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(2) "dwelling repetition versus fleeting reference," and (3) the purpose for
which the material was broadcast.2 49 The material has a greater possibility of
being deemed indecent if it is "explicit" in its description of sex or excretory
functions. 2 ° Further, material will be found indecent if the underlying, if not
explicit, meaning was "unmistakably" indecent.2 ' For example, the following
is an excerpt of a broadcast that used only the names of candy but implied sex:
"Oh what a piece of juicy fruit she was too. She screamed Oh, Crackerjack.
You're better than the Three Musketeers! As I rammed my Ding Dong up her
Rocky Road and into her Peanut Butter Cup ... Sure enough nine months
later, out popped Baby Ruth. 52 The broadcast was ultimately found indecent
by the FCC.5 3
The more the potentially indecent material is repeated, the better the chances
it will be found indecent by the FCC.254 The FCC may not find the material
indecent if the material is a mistake or "isolated." '255 For example, when a
newscaster mistakenly said, "Oops, fucked that one up," the FCC held there
was no indecency due to the "accidental nature" of the broadcast.5 6 Yet,
material will be deemed indecent, even when fleeting, if the material is
patently offensive because one of the other factors, like graphic nature, is
present.
257
There is an increased chance the FCC will find material indecent if the
purpose of the broadcast was to "titillate" or for "shock value. 258  This
rationale was used in Pacifica to uphold the FCC's finding of indecency in the
airing of the Carlin monologue. 259 However, if the FCC finds that the purpose
of the material isn't to "titillate" but rather was "instructional in nature," such
as a broadcast of a portion of a high school sexual education class in which
"realistic" models of anatomy were shown on television, the FCC will not find
the material indecent.
26
When complaints are filed, and they are not summarily dismissed, there are
four potential outcomes: 26' (1) the FCC may find that the material was not
patently offensive and dismiss the complaint; (2) they may request further
249 Industry Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. at 8003, 8008, 8010.
250 Id. at 8003.
251 Id. at 8005.
252 Id. at 8006.
253 Id.
254 Industry Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. at 8008.
255 Id.
256 Id at 8009.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 8010.
259 Industry Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. at 8010.
260 ld. at 8011.
261 Id. at 8015.
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material from the broadcaster; (3) they may fine the broadcaster through a
letter called a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL); or (4) they may issue a
generate a "formal referral" whereby the entire Commission would review the
case.262 Although there have been several monetary fines issued over the years
for radio broadcasts, there have only been two fines levied against television
broadcasts.263 The first was a $21,000 fine against a Puerto Rico television
station issued in 2001 for "raw sexual innuendo. '264 The most recent was a
$27,500 fine against a San Francisco television station when an entertainer's
penis was exposed during a performance by the theater group "Puppetry of the
Penis." '65
V. HAVEN'T WE ALREADY ADDRESSED INDECENCY?
Due to the fact that the current regulation system occurs "after the fact,"
there are several different devices in place that would aid parents in monitoring
and detecting indecency on television before their children are exposed to it.
One such device is the V-Chip. 266 V-Chip technically stands for "Violence
Chip," 267 but it works in a manner that also prevents exposure to sex and
indecency.268 The V-Chip works in conjunction with another one of the
preemptive devices available to parents, the television rating system
guidelines. 269 There are six different ratings given to television programming,
ranging from programming described as able to be viewed by "all children" to
material recommended for "mature audience only. '2 70
The television rating system, started in 1996, is the result of a request made
262 Id.
263 PARENT'S TELEVISION COUNCIL, DERELICTION OF DUTY: HOW THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION HAS FAILED THE PUBLIC, at http://www.parents-
tv.org/PTC/publications/reports/fccwhitepaper/main.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 David V. Scott, The V-Chip Debate: Blocking Television Sex, Violence, and the First
Amendment, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 741,744 (1996).
267 Id.
268 Stephen Williams, Parent's Ignorance Undermines Effectiveness of V-Chip, SALT
LAKE TRIB. Jul. 24, 2000, at B7.
269 Id.
270 FCC, THE V-CHIP: PUTTING RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT YOUR CHILDREN WATCH, EVEN
WHEN YOU'RE NOT THERE, at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/vchip.html (last modi-
fied Mar. 25, 2002). The six rating systems are: "TV-Y (All Children)... ;TV-7 (Directed
to Older Children)... appropriate for children age 7 and up... TV-G (General Audi-
ence) ... suitable for all ages but is not necessarily a children's show ... TV-PG (Parental
Guidance Suggested)... may also include "V" for violence, "S" for sexual situations, "L"
for language, or "D" for suggestive dialog; TV-14 (Parents Strongly Cau-
tioned).. unsuitable for children under 14; and TV-MA (Mature Audience Only)... un-
suitable for children under 17." Id.
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by Congress to the broadcasting industry for a voluntary rating system.27" ' The
rating system now appears on the screen at the beginning of television shows
and is also available in magazines, and other print sources.272 The rating
system was promulgated by the National Association of Broadcasters, the
National Cable Television Association, and the Motion Picture Association of
America. 73 The system is monitored by a twenty-four member group external
to the FCC called the TV Parental Guidelines Monitoring Board.274 However,
there are also certain programs that do not get rated.275 They are "news, sports,
and unedited movies on premium cable channels. 276
The V-Chip, which is placed into television sets when they are
manufactured, works by allowing parents to block programming based on this
rating system. 277 An external box equipped with V-Chip technology is also
available if a parent wants the technology, but does not own a television set
with the built in V-Chip. 78 The cost of the V-Chip is minimal with
manufacturing costs of "less than one dollar.' 279 Because the V-Chip works off
of the rating system, the programs that are not covered by the rating system
will not be blocked by the V-Chip.28 ° Therefore, sports, news and certain cable
movies will not be blocked.
Additionally, there is an external box that works off of the closed captioning
system and blocks profane language.28 ' This language filter box, called the
"TV Guardian," checks closed caption phrases, which are imbedded into
programming for the deaf, and scans for words or phrases that are
"offensive. 282  If such material is detected, the TV Guardian mutes the
television during that particular material but "displays acceptable words and
phrases 283 in a closed caption type format.2 4 The TV Guardian costs $119.95,
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 FCC, THE V-CHIP: PUTTING RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT YOUR CHILDREN WATCH, EVEN
WHEN YOU'RE NOT THERE, at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/vhip.html (last modi-
fied Mar. 25, 2002).
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 FCC, THE V-CHIP: PUTTING RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT YOUR CHILDREN WATCH, EVEN
WHEN YOU'RE NOT THERE, at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/vhip.htm (last modi-
fied Mar. 25, 2002).
281 Jeannine F. Hunter, Tired of TV Profanity? Answer May be in This Box, KNOXVILLE
NEWS-SENTINEL, Jul. 14, 1999, at Al.
282 GET READY FOR A REFRESHING CHANGE IN T.V. VIEWING!, at
http://www.dallascursefreetv.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
283 Id. In addition to typical obscenities, the TV Guardian also has an option to block
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but is limited only to programs with closed captioning.285 Sports, news and
other live programs therefore, are not filtered by the TV Guardian. 88
VI. WHERE WE ARE GOING
The success rate of the V-Chip, rating system and other devices has been
minimal.287 Studies indicate that some parents do not even know about the
devices and of those that are aware, most do not know how to properly work
the devices.288 Also, since these devices do not apply to all programs, they
leave open the possibility for incidents like the Janet Jackson spectacle at the
Super Bowl (since it was aired during a sports program which is not rated).
The watchdog group PTC additionally claims that programs are often given the
wrong rating and that the rating system has led to an increase in indecent
material as opposed to a decrease.28 PTC claims that the rating system has
given "networks free reign to push the TV envelope as long as they put the
right stamp on it."29
In light of the perceived failure of the current devices,29 ' and the recent well-
publicized controversial airings on television, there have been several new
proposals geared at curbing indecency.292 Two new congressional Acts directly
address indecency. The first is H.R. 3687, a bill dubbed the "Clean Airwaves
Act" and introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Doug
Ose in December 2003. 293 Representative Ose, a Republican from California,
was inspired to present The Clean Airwaves Act after the FCC ruling finding
Bono's use of the word "fluck" not indecent as an adjective.294 The Clean
Airwaves Act would ban completely the use of the following words and
phrases: shit, piss, fuck, asshole, cock sucker, mother fucker and ass hole.295
The words would be banned in any form, to include "verb, adjective, gerund,
"offenses to the name of God and Jesus Christ". Id.
284 Hunter, supra note 281.
285 GET READY FOR A REFRESHING CHANGE IN T.V. VIEWING!, at
http://www.dallascursefreetv.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
286 Hunter, supra note 281.
287 PARENT'S TELEVISION COUNCIL, STUDIES REPORT V-CHIP FAILINGS, at
http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/publications/ealerts/2000/ealertO62800.asp (June 28, 2000).
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Lynn Elber, TV Too Nastyfor Kids, Stud4, Says, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2001, at R10.
291 See Children's Protection from Violent Programming Act, S. 161, 108th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2003) (stating that indecent programming has an adverse effect on children and admits
that current "technology" is unable to protect children in all situations.)
292 See Epstein, supra note 19.
293 Clean Airwaves Act, H.R. 3687, 108th Cong. (lst Sess. 2003).
294 Epstein, supra note 19.
295 H.R. 3687.
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participle, and infinitive forms" as well as any "compound use" of the
words." '296 Representative Ose states that his goal is to prevent the FCC from
"split[ting] hairs" and basing rulings on grammar.297 The Clean Airwaves Act
would amend the language in 18 U.S.C. § 1464.9
Another legislative measure, Senate Resolution No. 283, was introduced in
the Senate in December, 2003.299 The resolution urges the FCC to "reassert its
responsibility as defender of the public interest" by using "all of its available
authority.""3 ° Among the list of requests stated in the resolution, the Senate
asks the FCC to reconsider the Bono ruling, start imposing fines for each
"separate utterance," and initiating license revocation hearings.30' The House
of Representatives introduced a similar resolution in January of 2004.302
Additionally, in January of 2004, the Children's Protection from Violent
Programming Act was introduced into the House of Representatives.3 3 This
Act, introduced by Republican Fred Upton from Michigan, would increase the
fine levied against indecency from $27,500 to $275,000.3o  Current FCC
Chairman Michael Powell supported the increase.0  A similar bill was
introduced to the Senate in February, 2004 by Republican Senator Sam
Brownback from Kansas.306
Other theories for improving indecency standards include allowing affiliates
choosing which programs to air,0 and then replacing potentially indecent
programs with one less racy.30 There is also a push for the FCC to require all
"live" shows be tape delayed, which is not currently mandatory.
30 9
Additionally, there has already been some self regulation imposed by the
296 Id.
297 Epstein, supra note 19; see also 149 CONG. REC. E2468-01 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003)
(statement of Rep. Ose) (stating that he hopes the bill will close a "loophole in the U.S.
Code to ensure the pubic is free from inappropriate communications over public broadcasts
and that our airwaves can be clean of obscenity, indecency, and profanity.")
298 H.R. 3687.
299 S. Res. 283, 108th Cong. (2003).
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 H. Res. 500, 108th Cong. (2004).
303 Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, H.R. 3717, (2004).
304 Glenn Garvin, Fallout; After Janet Jackson's Exposure, Networks Cover Their Bases
and Brace for Tough New Decency Rules, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2004, at Al.
305 Id.
306 FCC Indecency Penalties Bill, S.2056, 108th Cong. (2004).
307 See Doug Saunders, CHUM axes Stern's Radio, Television Talk Shows, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 27, 1998, at Cl. The FCC does not have a choice in what programs
are aired. See F.C.C., TELEVISION AND CABLE, at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/broadcast.html
(last modified Dec. 6, 2002).
308 Eric Deggans, Wildly Popular 'Springer' Worries Station By Being so Wild Series,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Feb. 19, 1998, at 2B.
309 Jensen, supra note 8.
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broadcast industry, such as tape-delaying live programs (as was done for the
Grammys in 2004)"' and broadcasters choosing to edit out material that may
be considered indecent even if it is aired during the safe harbor hours (as NBC
did when they edited a bare breast out of a scene about a breast exam on ER).3'"
VII. BUT WHAT HAPPENED TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH?
Some free speech advocates disagree with the plans to further restrict
indecency on television. These advocates feel that parents, rather than the
government, should be the ones placing limits on what children see on
television.3 2 Syracuse University professor Robert Thompson has stated his
belief that regulations like the Clean Airwaves Act are attempting to bring all
broadcasting to the level of a child, which makes television less interesting to
adults.' Professor Thompson calls the bill's tactic of "spelling out" indecent
words "juvenile."3 4
Other advocates assert that there is no "harm" in allowing obscenities to be
aired and therefore more regulation is not necessary.3 5 Cal State professor
Craig Smith, who leads the Center for First Amendment Studies, has said that
proving damages from the use of obscenities in broadcasting is "a burden [the
government] can't meet."3 6 Mr. Smith is one of the advocates of free speech
who feels that many of the words included in the legislation are not
offensive." 7 Others claim that nudity alone, like that of Janet Jackson's breast
at the Super Bowl, is not enough to merit indecency and, therefore, should not
be punished.3"8
Still other advocates claim that the government's new legislation is
attempting to protect not children, but adults, an activity for which there is no
government interest.3"9 Advocates like Jeremy Lipschultz from the University
of Nebraska, Omaha, say that this is demonstrated because the proposed laws
310 Id.
311 Garvin, supra note 304.
312 Epstein, supra note 19.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Doug Saunders, Wanna Hear the F-word? Fuhgeddaboutit! A Republican Con-
gressman Launches a Bill to Outlaw Seven Vulgarities From U.S. Airwaves, THE GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 13, 2004, at A3.
318 Jensen, supra note 8.
319 Talk of the Nation: Analysis: Obscenity Over the Airways and Whether Congress or
the FCC Should Tighten Restrictions and Regulations (NPR Radio Broadcast, Jan. 28,
2004) [hereinafter Talk of the Nation].
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have no "safe harbors" in them. 2 ° Professor Lipshultz explains that current
laws limit the restriction on indecency only to hours when children are likely to
be present, but the newly proposed legislation would be in effect 24 hours a
day. 2 ' Therefore, advocates say that the newly proposed bills will not pass
constitutional muster if challenged in court because they are overly broad and
the indecency standard is difficult to define.322
VIII. WILL THE NEW LAWS EVEN WORK?
When upholding the proposed legislation to the level of scrutiny it must pass
in order to restrain speech on television, we must consider the test involved.
The government must assert a "compelling reason" and they must accomplish
their goal in the most "narrow" way possible 323 The government's reason for
regulating indecency on television is to protect children from indecency.324
Against this backdrop, there are potential problems that exist. By not limiting
the time that the words included in the Clean Airwaves Act should be
restricted, the legislation is not employing the least restrictive means.
Therefore, the legislation has the potential to not be seen as "narrowly tailored"
to meet the goal of protecting the children. 26 Therefore, the Clean Airwaves
Act, as written, would have difficulty withstanding a constitutional challenge.
This potential problem could be lessened by the insertion of a "safe harbor"
clause that would limit the banned words to certain hours.323 Creating "safe
harbor" hours, which would limit the words only between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.,
is most logical because that would conform the Clean Airwaves Act to present
indecency regulations.32
Additionally, the Clean Airwaves Act would limit the definition for
indecency by automatically making certain words indecent by their mere
utterance.3 29 This has the potential for two problems. First, it would remove
the contextual aspect of review, which is now afforded by the FCC to
indecency complaints. There would be no application of the factors set out by
320 Id.
321 Id
322 Id.
323 Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1247 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
324 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 (1978).
325 See generally Talk of the Nation, supra note 319.
326 See U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (discussing the
implications of a statute that is not narrowly tailored).
327 See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726 (upholding a restriction on indecency to cer-
tain times of day).
328 See 18 U.S.C. §1464 (2000).
329 Clean Airwaves Act, H.R. 3687, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
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the FCC. This has the potential to make words that were uttered by mistake or
not for "shock value" nevertheless deemed indecent and subject to a fine. For
example, if there were a legitimate live news cast in which one of the words
was inadvertently aired, the broadcaster would be fined without a chance for
explanation.33 The Clean Airwaves Act ("the Act") functions as a prior
restraint on speech and is potentially overly broad in that it does not allow the
FCC to view words in context and apply their established factors. As an overly
broad regulation, the Act would not withstand a constitutional challenge.3 '
This defect could be decreased by revising the language in the Act to allow the
FCC leeway to evaluate utterances of the banned words by applying their
established factors. To maintain the broad sweep of the Act that legislators
desired, language could be inserted to mandate that the FCC automatically
review all instances in which the words are uttered.
An additional way to curb indecency without resorting to prior restraint
would be for broadcasters to have more responsibility in the monitoring for
indecency.332 This could be achieved by mandating that broadcasters employ a
delay system for live broadcasts.333 The FCC should make the guidelines
sufficiently clear so broadcasters would know what programs had to be
delayed and how long the delay should be. The FCC should, for example, state
whether live sports programs would have to be tape delayed.
Broadcasters could also take it upon themselves to contract with their "on
air" talent to prevent exhibitions like that which occurred during Super Bowl
XXXVIII. This could be achieved through contracts between the broadcasters
and the entertainers. Broadcasters will never be able to be completely
responsible for the on air talent.334 Performers will always be looking for
additional publicity, even if it comes at the cost of the broadcasters.335 Creating
contractual agreements would not prevent a fine if indecent utterances
occurred, however, it would give more incentive for entertainers not to be
indecent if they knew they would be subject to a penalty or cause of action for
breach of contract.
The second deficit of the Clean Airwaves Act is that limiting the definition
of indecency to designated words "flies in the face" of the current concept of
indecency.336 Indecency is based on the "community standard.""33 This allows
330 See generally Talk of the Nation, supra note 319.
331 BLACK'S, supra note 121, at 1129.
332 Protecting Children from Violent and Indecent Programming Before the Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate, 108th Cong. (statement of Kathleen
Abernathy, Commissioner, FCC).
333 Id.
334 Oldenburg, supra note 17.
335 ld.
336 Talk of the Nation, supra note 319.
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the definition to be viewed in light of the changing attitudes of what society
deems acceptable. One should not forget that at one point in American history
using inferences about the word "bathroom" was not allowed to be uttered on
television. This illustrates the fact that words do not remain unacceptable
forever.338 The current indecency definition has been upheld by the Court,
validating the fluid concept of indecency. " 9
Ambiguity is a necessary evil in lawmaking because it is impossible to cover
all of the potential words or phrases that a particular person may find
offensive. To make the boundaries of indecency clearer without resorting to a
list of specific words, the FCC could come up with clearer guidelines on how
they will weigh the factors of implication, fleeting reference and purpose. To
date, the only guidance the FCC has given broadcasters is to acknowledge that
these are factors that they use.34° The application of these factors has resulted
in the arbitrary assignment of fines. 4  There is no bright line rule that says
how many of the factors need to be present to prevent a fine or if certain
factors are given more weight in the determination of indecency than others.
To aid broadcasters, the FCC could prioritize the factors in the order they feel
are most important.
3 42
Likewise, the FCC should disclose to broadcasters how factors relate to one
another. For example, if an utterance was used fleetingly by an athlete during
sports show where the purpose of the broadcast was innocent, how would the
FCC respond? In this scenario, the fact that the utterance was fleeting would
tend to favor not fining for indecency, but this is not always the case. The
FCC eventually ruled that Bono's use of the word "fuck" was indecent, despite
the fact that it was fleeting.3 43 In the past, however, fleeting use of "fuck" had
been dismissed. 44 More definite guidelines as to how the factors will be
applied and how the FCC determines what constitutes the "community
337 FCC, OBSCENE AND INDECENT BROADCASTS, at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumer-
facts/obscene.html (last modified Apr. 12, 2004).
338 See generally Edwin A. Roberts Jr., Lewd Sitcoms Hardly Define Our Culture,
TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 4, 1999, at 1.
339 See generally Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S.
727 (1996).
340 See generally In re Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law Interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement,
16 FCC Rcd. 7999 (2001).
341 Id.
342 See generally Ahrens, supra note 2.
343 Complaints Against Various Broadcasting Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, File No. EB-03-1H-
0110 available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-03-3045A1.pdf
(last visited Oct., 2004).
344 Industry Guidance, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999.
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standard" could alleviate some of the uncertainty about the indecency standard.
The downfall of the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004,345 which
increases the fines for incidents of indecency, is that it is still not enough of a
deterrent for the large corporations who own broadcast stations. The probable
effect on deep pocket broadcasters will be minimal.3 46  A company like
Viacom, the owner of CBS, that aired the Super Bowl, has revenues each year
in excess of twenty-six billion dollars.3 47 Fines of as much as $250,000 would
still barely be effective, particularly considering that the cost of a commercial
for the Super Bowl is more than the amount of the fine. Viacom earns over
seven billion dollars on television alone.348
The increased fines will do little to remedy the flaws in the penalty system
employed by the FCC. One problem encompassed in the FCC penalty system
is the disparity between the treatment of broadcast television and cable
television.14' The fact that so many people in America have access to cable
suggests that maintenance of two different standards is outdated.35 ° The effect
is such that broadcast channels have to air racy or cutting edge programming to
financially compete with viewers of cable channels.35 The fact that more
viewers tune into the cable channels and watch programs that push the limit of
indecency suggests that the community standard of what is indecent may be
less than what the current legislation has proposed.
The Court has made clear that cable cannot be held to the same heightened
regulation to which broadcast is subjected,352 so perhaps the FCC should make
it clearer how they determine the community standard. This could be
accomplished by compiling complaints and releasing data on (1) why
complaints were launched, (2) by whom complaints were launched (private
citizen versus watchdog group), and (3) what prompted the complaint.
Releasing this data and having it evaluated not only by the FCC, but also
subject to public scrutiny would validate or invalidate labeling terms or actions
as indecent. For example, if there were 100 complaints about the use of the
word "asshole" and they all came from the same group, this may not accurately
345 H.R. 3717, 108th Cong. (2004).
346 Talk of the Nation, supra note 319.
347 Viacom Reports Full Year and Fourth Quarter 2003 Results; Announces Plans to
Divest Ownership Interest in Blockbuster, at http://www.viacom.com/pdf/qr4q03.pdf (last
visited Apr. 21, 2004).
348 Id. at 6.
349 Frank Ahrens, Nasty Language on Live TV Renews Old Debate, WASH. POST, Dec.
13, 2003, at Al.
350 Smith, supra note 225.
35' Talk of the Nation, supra note 319.
352 See generally Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996).
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reflect that the "community" felt "asshole" qualified as indecent. Under the
current penalty system, the FCC's five Commissioners and the Regulatory
Board decide what constitutes the "community standard". To make the
definition less ambiguous the community at large has a right to know on what
information the FCC bases their decision. The public should also have the
opportunity to play a more active role in determining what the "community
standard" is. This could be accomplished by having a committee of sorts
comprised of non-political, non-FCC citizens who could express their input to
the FCC on debated topics of indecency.
If the FCC does not think it possible to more clearly define "community
standard," they could also curb indecent acts more efficiently by making
license revocation hearings mandatory after a series of indecent broadcasts. 53
This would force broadcasters to answer to the FCC for repeated acts of
indecency. A "three strike" rule or something similar could be employed
whereby broadcasters would automatically loose their license for a period of
time after being fined for three indecent broadcasts. To avoid overbreadth
problems, there could be a time limit in which the "three strikes" would apply,
for example three fines in six months.
IX. CONCLUSION
If Congress truly seeks to have an effect on broadcasters' behavior regarding
indecent programming, then fines need to be far greater than the maximum
currently proposed and the penalty system employed by the FCC needs to be
revamped. If the FCC does not make significant changes to repair its flawed
penalty system, the need for competition with cable will just force broadcasters
to include the costs of fines into the "price of doing business." The FCC needs
to get a greater appreciation for the community standard and actually apply it
to cases where there is clearly indecent behavior. It simply does not stand to
reason that in the history of television, there have only been two instances of
indecency. However, targeting certain words as indecent, as is done in the
Clean Airwaves Act, is not the right answer. A broad sweeping prior restraint
is too high a cost for our First Amendment to pay.
353 See generally S. Res. 283, 108th Cong. (2003).
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